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Abstract
With census data on comparably defined American and Japanese markets, I assess the
extent to which competitive advantage is determined by market network structure in the
two economies. I find significant differences between markets in the two economies, but
on average, the social structural parameters known to determine the relative performance
of American markets similarly determine the relative performance of Japanese markets.
Profit margins are similar on average in corresponding Japanese and American markets,
but performance differences between similarly structured American and Japanese markets
increase with competitive disadvantage. Being at a competitive disadvantage in Japan is
less costly than in the United States.
With the rise of Japan as an economic power relative to the United States, much social
science attention has been given to how Japan is different from the United States. The
image of the Japanese economy is a weave of dense and multiplex relations (Caves and
Uekusa, 1976) in which visible and unspoken obligations obscure the market mechanisms
that guide the day-to-day buying and selling (Dore, 1983; Kumon, 1992). The perception
of a diffuse, permeable, and overlapping nexus of relations (Lincoln et al., 1992) at the
core of the Japanese economy, combined with methodological culturalism (Hamilton,
1988) befog the situation. Studies have pointed out various dimensions of the Japanese
economy believed to be characteristic of the economy and responsible for its high
performance: high savings ratios, groupism, work ethics and the spirit of Japanese
capitalism (Dore, 1983), human resource management and the employment system (Aoki,
1988), industrial policies and protectionism (Eads, 1988).
A preliminary question remains unanswered. How different are the transactional
environments of American and Japanese producers? If Japanese buying and selling is
constrained in some way different from the market constraints on American producers,
different forms of organization are to be expected. If markets in the two economies are
defined by similar patterns of constrained transactions, then observed differences between
organization forms in the two economies are due to other factors, such as cultural and
historical differences in the development of the forms.
I have census data on buying and selling among American and Japanese markets,
market performance, and the organization of producers within markets. I find significant
differences between markets in the two economies, but on average, the social structural
parameters known to determine the relative performance of American markets similarly
2determine the relative performance of Japanese markets. Japanese and American firms
are built on the same patterns of market transaction constraint. Their resource
environments are similar in structure. Their differences lie in how they respond to the
constraints.
MODEL AND DATA
Network models of competition are a productive result of increased exchange between
economics and sociology over the last two decades. The sociological ideas elaborated by
Georg Simmel and Robert Merton of autonomy generated by conflicting affiliations are
mixed with the traditional economic ideas of monopoly power and oligopoly to produce
network models of the extent to which producers in a market have a competitive
advantage in negotiating the price of their transactions with suppliers and customers. The
network models measure opportunities to broker connections between others - by
having weak ties to distant others (Granovetter, 1973, 1983), by being between others
(Freeman, 1977, 1979), or by having many diverse and exclusive relations (Cook and
Emerson, 1978; Burt, 1980, 1982, 1983; Cook et al., 1983; Markovsky, Willer and
Patton, 1988).
These variations on the brokerage theme are the foundation for the structural hole
theory of competition (Burt, 1992). The generating principle is that a transaction is more
difficult to negotiate, and so less rewarding, when it is locked into other transactions that
have to be negotiated at the same time. Discontinuities between transactions create
entrepreneurial opportunities for brokerage. Brokerage provides information and control
benefits. The benefits are a competitive advantage in negotiating transactions. So, the
distribution of the discontinuities, or holes, in the social structure of transactions give
competitive advantage to certain players at the expense of others. Among other things,
players with a competitive advantage are expected to get a better return on their
investments; e.g., faster promotions, higher profit margins, more sympathetic policy
decisions.
The competitive advantage can be measured by the network concept of structural
autonomy. Applied to networks of buying and selling, structural autonomy increases
with the extent to which producers are organized within a market (few structural holes
between producers) and transactions are disorganized beyond the market (many structural
holes between suppliers and customers). Autonomous producers can negotiate
advantageous prices in their transactions with suppliers and customers. The
advantageous prices allow producer budgets to expand in various ways, including the
bottom line; profit margins should increase with structural autonomy.
3There is evidence to support the argument. Burt (1983) documents the association
in 1967 between profits and structural autonomy in American manufacturing markets
defined at broad and detailed levels of aggregation. Burt (1988) extends the results into
nonmanufacturing through the 1960s and 1970s. Using profit and network data on
markets in other countries, similar results have been observed in Germany during the
1970s (Ziegler, 1982) and Israel during the 1970s (Talmud, 1992, 1993). There is also
evidence to support the argument in interpersonal relations. Manager promotions can be
traced to the structural holes in a manager's network (Burt, 1992, Chap. 4), and strategic
political behavior is patterned by network constraints between organization elites
(Garguilo, 1992, 1993). My purpose in this paper is to compare Japanese and American
markets from network perspective and see how well the argument describes performance
differences between them.
For this paper, I use data on 44 aggregate markets distinguished by the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The 44 markets include 7 raw
material markets, 22 manufacturing markets, and 15 service and distribution markets. In
addition, households and government agencies are included as customer marketsl The
Ministry of International Trade and Industry constructed an input-output table of
transactions among markets within each economy and between markets in the two
economies (MiTI, 1989). Transactions in the Japanese economy are based on a 1985
census of establishments. Yen are converted to dollars at the 1985 exchange rate (238.54
yen to the dollar, MITI, 1989, p. 4). Transactions in the American economy are a re-
compilation of data used by the US Department of Commerce to construct the 1982
benchmark input-output table that was released in 1991. Instead of 40 players in Figure 1
aggregated into seven markets, there are thousands of business establishments in the
American economy aggregated into 44 markets, and thousands of establishments in the
Japanese economy aggregated into the same 44 markets. The criterion for aggregation is
the same. Business establishments are aggregated into the same market if they depend on
business with the same other markets. The data are a census of business establishments.
With the input-output table, MITI has provided a density table describing the network of
transactions among and between American and Japanese business establishments.
These are markets in the sense that they are defined to contain establishments
producing substitutable goods; each is obligated by current production technologies to
lrm ignoring the "unclassified" market;of scrap, used and second-hand goods, noncomparable
imports, and inventory valuation adjustments. Network constraint weights constructed with and without the
"unclassified" market yield nearly identical transaction constraint coefficients (.98 correlation).
purchase a certain proportion of supplies from specific other markets, and their customers
are shaped by their own technological requirements. This image of producers being
competitors within the same market to the extent that they are substitutable in their
transactions with suppliers and customers is a general one. It is captured in theory by
certain equivalence definitions in network analysis and is the basis for interorganization
resource dependence and the image of biological competition in population ecology
analyses of organizations (see Burt, 1992, Chaps 6 and 7, Burt and Talmud, 1993, for
elaboration).
I use concentration data to measure producer organization inside market; O varies
from zero to one with the extent to which there are few independent producers. Each
aggregate market is a set of market segments defined in the United States by four-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories. Variable O is average concentration
within segments. 2 Concentration data on manufacturing are from the Census of
Manufactures, concentration in nonmanufacturing is approximated with sales data in
other census publications from the US Department of Commerce, and the map of SIC
categories into aggregate markets is taken from the Survey of Current Business (see Burt,
1988, p. 370; 1992, pp. 89-91, for detailed discussion). To describe the Japanese
markets, I used unpublished records of four-firm concentration in manufacturing and a
few nonmanufacturing markets provided by the Fair Trade Committee of Japan for 1988.
In the remaining nonmanufacturing markets, I approximate concentration with sales data
as in the US. I identified the four largest firms operating in each market (in the Toyo
Keizai compilation of 10,000 largest Japanese firms for 1985), summed their sales, and
divided by total market sales. These can be crude approximations. ru use multiple
strategies for comparing producer organization between markets.
Markets aren't independent production sites. They are variably interdependent
within the political economy as a production network. A market's position in the network
of variable interdependence has implications for market behavior. This can be measured
by the extent to which producer buying and selling is concentrated in a few key customer
and supplier markets and those markets contain few independent players. The essential
qualities to be captured by the measure of organization beyond markets are the extent to
which producers do business in very few different markets and those few are tied by
exclusive dependence on one another (see Burt, 1992, pp. 54-62 on alternative
2 0 is defined as follows; O = wk wkCRk, where segment weight wk is the proportion of market
sales that come from segment k (wk = Sk/( Skit), where Sk is the dollars of sales by establishments in
segment k), and CRk is the four-firm concentration ratio for segment k (largest sum of sales for
establishments owned by any four companies in the segment divided by total sales by all establishments in
the segment).
I
5specifications and connections with laboratory results on exchange networks). Network
weight wij measures the extent to which producers in market i are dependent on, affected
by, can't avoid, conditions in market j. Transaction constraint coefficient cij varies from
zero to one measuring the extent to which there are few independently players in key
market j: cij = wijOj. So, three conditions constrain the transaction with market j: (1)
Buying and selling with market j is a high proportion of producer business, (2) Other
markets where producers buy and sell are in turn dependent on business with market j,
and (3) there are few competitors in market j to play against one another.
Producers in the structurally autonomous market positions of a population are
expected to show higher returns to investment; accumulating resources and further
opportunities. Their structural autonomy is defined by the extent that there are numerous
structural holes among the players with whom they negotiate and no holes among the
producers;
Ai = f(Oi, cil, ci2, ci3,...)
Hierarchical pattern in the constraint parameters indicates a strategic partner being used
legitimate the central player (Burt, 1992, chap. 4), but level is the feature of constraint
relevant for performance when legitimacy isn't an issue. The higher the aggregate level
of constraint on producers, the lower their expected returns to investment. The sum of
constraint parameters measures the aggregate constraint on producers; C varies inversely
with the extent to which a market's suppliers and customers are spread across many
disconnected markets that contain many competitors. The negative association between
performance and constraint is the critical piece of evidence that establishes the construct
validity of the constraint parameters. If the cij measure the resource constraints that
define optimum producer organization forms, then the aggregate level of constraint
should be negatively correlated with producer rates of return.
BASIC RESULTS
I measure market performance with price-cost margins computed from the input-output
data. Price-cost margin P is net market income divided by total income - specifically,
dollars of value added minus compensation to employees, quantity divided by total
market income. This is a standard measure for comparing performance across
manufacturing markets (attributed to Collins and Preston, 1969), and a reliable indicator
when computed from input-output data for comparing markets more generally (Burt,
1988, pp. 371-375).
______I________________
6Performance isn't identical in corresponding Japanese and American markets, but it
is very similar. Figure 2 plots the price-cost margin in each American market against the
margin in the corresponding Japanese market. Markets above the diagonal line are more
profitable in Japan. For example, steel producers in Japan earned an average 25¢ profit
on each dollar of sales in the mid-1980s, while American steel producers earned only 6¢
profit. Similarly, finance, farming, and beverages and tobacco are noticeably more
profitable in Japan. Below the diagonal in Figure 2, crude petroleum and natural gas
drilling ("oil & gas"), forestry, and coal mining are noticeably more profitable in the
United States. These deviations notwithstanding, market performance is more similar in
the two economies than it is different. The price-cost margins in corresponding markets
are correlated .76, standard deviations are identical within the two economies (.152), and
variation within each economy makes negligible the slight mean difference between the
economies . Mean price-cost margins are .23 across the Japanese markets, and .19 across
American markets.3 No significant performance difference between the two economies.
Figure 2 and Table 1 About Here
The results in Table 1 extend the similarity to market structure effects in the two
economies. The basic model states performance as a function of structural autonomy,
which decreases with producer disorganization and decreases with organization beyond
the market (Burt, 1992, pp. 92-100; Burt, Yasuda, and Guilarte, 1993):
eP = A = oa(l-O)C Y,
where P is the price-cost margin expected from market structure, O is concentration, and
C is the sum of constraints on producer transactions with supplier and customer markets.
Estimates of the parameters are presented in Table 1 across all 88 markets, and across the
44 markets within each economy. The expected price-cost margin decreases significantly
with market disorganization4 and organization beyond the market. 5 In addition, analysis
of American markets through the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s distinguishes land and
oil markets for their autocorrelated profits consistently higher than expected from market
structure. The markets returning exceptional profits are real estate, crude petroleum and
natural gas (oil and gas; not to be confused with petroleum refining), forestry and fishery
products, and farning (excluding livestock). The dummy variable adjustment for these
markets in Table 1 shows their significantly higher price-cost margins in both economies.
Finally, returning to the null hypothesis of no performance difference between Japanese
3 1.1 t-test with 86 degrees of freedom fails to reject the null hypothesis of no performance
difference between the two economies, P = 30.
4 < 0, with t-tests of -2.0 to -3.3.
5 < 0, with t-tests of -1.9 to -2.7.
------__________^_l·__·^1_1___1i_~~~
7and American markets, the first column of Table 1 contains a dummy variable
distinguishing Japanese markets from American markets. The test for no performance
difference is now more precise because market structure variables O and C hold constant
a portion of the price-cost margin variance within each economy. Margins are still higher
in Japanese markets, and the t-test of 1.6 is stronger than the zero-order test of 1.1, but
there is still no significant performance difference on average between corresponding
Japanese and American markets.6
In sum, despite the very broad definition of markets in these data, there is evidence
to argue for a similar structure-performance connection in Japan and the United States.
ryve compared profit margins for 44 kinds of production activities in the two economies.
The market structure effects known to predict performance differences between American
markets - performance decreasing with market disorganization and the network
constraint of organization beyond the market - also predict performance differences
between Japanese markets.
CLOSER LOOK AT MARKET STRUCTURE
Though differences between the Japanese and American markets are negligible relative to
their similarities, the differences exist. rll now look more closely at market structure in
the two economies to better understand the observed performance differences. Market
structure in the network model is defined by two variables; producer organization 0, here
measured by concentration, and the network of market interdependencies defined by the
network constraint weights wij measured with the input-output data on dollars of buying
and selling between markets. The two variables combine to define the level of constraint
C on producer buying and selling with suppliers and customers.
Market Interdependence
The volume of buying and selling between markets is determined by technology. Car
producers, for example, are obliged under current technology to purchase supplies from
specific markets; steel, rubber, plastics, electronics, and so on. It is a short step to
conclude that market interdependence in Japan should look the same as in the United
States to the extent that production technologies are similar in the two economies. The
conclusion would be true if the economies were self-contained. But the inter-market
buying and selling dictated by production technology can be transacted inside or outside
6 With 83 degrees of freedom for the 1.6 t-test, the null hypothesis has a .11 probability of being
true under a routine two-tail test.
__I 
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8the economy; between domestic producers or with producers in foreign markets. Market
interdependence can be different in Japan and the United States to the extent that foreign
trade affects different markets in the two economies.
Figure 3 and Table 2 About Here
Figure 3 and Table 2 present results on the relative strength of transactions between
Japanese markets and the corresponding strength of transactions between their American
counterparts. Transaction strength is based on the buying and selling between markets
given in the input-output table. Divide the buying and selling between two markets by
the sum of all buying and selling by the markets with other sectors in their economy. The
result multiplied by 100 is the percent of domestic buying and selling by two markets that
is conducted with each other. 7 There are 946 transaction dyads among the 44 markets in
each economy. Transactions above the diagonal line in Figure 3 are conducted more
between domestic producers in the Japanese economy. The three solid dots are extreme
cases: Japanese machinery and metal products are more often constructed from Japanese
steel (American machinery and metal products are more often constructed from imported
steel). Household appliances in Japan are more often constructed from Japanese electric
parts and accessories. Transactions below the diagonal line in Figure 3 are conducted
more between domestic producers in the American economy. Petroleum refining is more
dependent on crude petroleum from American producers, and power (electric and gas)
utilities are more dependent on oil and gas fuel supplies from American firms.
Americans eat more American livestock, and that livestock is more dependent on feed
grains from American farms. Finally, American medical and health services are more
often provided with instruments manufactured by American firms. 8
7 Specifically, let dij be the combined dollars of sales and purchases between markets i and j; dij =
zij + zji. Let SUMi be the summed sales and purchases by producers in market i excluding their business
with one another, SUMi = Ij dij. The symmetric transaction strength measure in Figure 3 and Table 2 is
100*dij/(SUMi + SUMj - dij).
8This is the only transaction for the medical and instruments markets that is so different in the two
economies. I constructed a dummy variable for all transactions involving the medical market and another
distinguishing all transaction involving the instruments market. I computed the absolute difference
between transactions in Japan and the United States, and regressed differences across the two dummy
variables. Differences are not significantly higher for either dummy (with all 946 transactions included,
.015 multiple correlation, or with the seven solid dot outliers in Figure 3 excluded, .069 multiple
correlation). The next largest difference is the slightly higher tendency for Japanese medical services to be
11_1
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9Transactions in the two economies are otherwise quite similar. The correlation
between the 946 corresponding transactions in the two economies is .816 if the seven
solid dot outliers in Figure 3 are excluded. That's two-thirds of variance in transaction
strength identical between the two economies.
Table 2 shows how the aggregate correlation varies across kinds of markets. For
example, there are seven raw materials markets in the MIrI input-output table, and so 21
transaction dyads between raw materials markets. Their relative strength is very similar
in Japan and the United States (.951 correlation).
Transactions involving manufacturing are very similar, in the two economies,
whereas transactions between raw materials markets and the 15 distribution and service
markets are least similar.9 An illustration is the greater tendency for American power
utilities, at the lower-right of Figure 3, to get their oil and gas fuel supplies from
American producers. I rank-ordered the 105 transactions in the lower-left cell of Table 2
by the absolute difference of their magnitudes in Japan and the United States. The oil
with power utilities transaction named in Figure 3 tops the list (.5% transaction in Japan,
8.7% in United States). The second largest difference also concerns fuel for power
utilities. American power utilities are more likely to get their coal supplies from
American mining firms (.7% transaction in Japan, 3.5% in United States). The third
largest difference is much smaller and again concerns fuel supplies. The transaction
between the real estate market and crude petroleum and natural gas producers is larger in
the United States (1.1% versus 0.0% in Japan). Put these three transactions to one side,
and the remaining 103 transactions are very similar in Japan and the United States (0.1%
average difference, .77 correlation).
In sum, the network of market interdependencies is similar in Japan and the United
States-allowing for certain outlier transactions. Reflecting Japan's scarce natural
resource, transactions between power utilities, petroleum refining, and crude petroleum
provided with supplies from Japanese chemical companies (chemicals-medical transaction is 133% in US
versus 3.9% in Japan).
9 Correlations between tansactions involving manufacturing are strong, but all increase to over .8
when the seven outlier markets in Figure 3 are excluded (.839 across 153 rnsactions with raw materials
markets, .831 across 329 transactions with distribution and services markets, and .845 across 228
transactions with other manufacturing markets). The weakest correlation is the .347, in the lower-left of
Table 2, across transactions between the 7 raw materials markets and the 15 distribution and services
markets.
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and coal are conducted more between domestic producers in the United States (three
transactions). Steel for machinery and metal products is more often purchased from
domestic producers in Japan (two transactions). Household appliances are more
constructed in Japan with parts and accessories purchased from Japanese producers (one
transaction). The American taste for beef is reflected in the larger domestic transactions
among the American food, livestock, and feed grain markets (two transactions). Medical
and health services in the United States are more often provided with instruments
manufactured by American firms (one transaction). Put these nine of 946 transactions to
one side, and the transaction strength between two Japanese markets is correlated .825
with the strength of transaction between the corresponding two American markets.
Moreover, the magnitudes of the differences are small. The absolute difference between
the nine outlier transactions in Japan and the United States varies from 2.8% to 21.3%,
with a 5.2% standard deviation and 8.8% mean. The absolute difference between the
other 937 transactions varies from being identical to a difference of 5.4%, with a 0.5%
standard deviation and 0.3% mean difference.
Organization within Markets
Given similar patterns of producer dependence on supplier and customer markets, the
other potential difference between markets in the two economies is the organization of
producers within the markets. The difference is clear in Figure 4. Concentration in
almost every Japanese market is as high, or higher, than concentration in the
corresponding American market. On average, Japanese markets are more concentrated.10
With the network of market interdependencies similar in Japan and the United States, the
higher concentration within Japanese markets means greater constraint on producer
transactions with supplier and customer markets. Constraint C varies from .01 to .269
across American markets, with .058 mean and .061 standard deviation. Across Japanese
markets, constraint varies from .022 to .413 with .096 mean and .09 standard deviation.
Market constraint is significantly higher in Japan. 11 Since profit margins are similar in
corresponding American and Japanese markets, the story here would be that better
organized Japanese producers, having to negotiate transactions with better organized
suppliers and customers, end up earning the same relative profit margins as their less
well-organized American counterparts.
10 2.75 t-test, P = .007.
11 2.30 t-test, P = .020.
_ ------- 
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Figure 4 About Here
An interesting story, but it is suspect. My concentration ratios are approximated in
several Japanese and American markets from corporate sales data. The large finns used
to approximate concentration are diversified across multiple markets. Treating all their
sales as if from one market overstates their sales in the market. Concentration
approximated from the aggregate sales of large diversified firms is likely to be higher
than census data on concentration which is computed from establishment sales data.
The concepts of effective organization and effective market constraint can be helpful as
introduced elsewhere to resolve issues in measuring producer organization (Burt, Yasuda
and Guilarte, 1993). Effective organization 0 varies from zero to one, and effective
market structure constraint M is greater than zero to the extent that producers are in effect
disorganized and dependent on effectively well-organized supplier and customer markets
(see Appendix for detail). The question answered is the following: To obtain their
known price-cost margin, operating from their known network position in the economy,
how well organized must producers be? The variable O that answers the question is
"effective" organization in the sense that producer organization is inferred from its
effects.
Figure 5 About Here -
Market performance is plotted across levels of effective market structure constraint
in Figure 5. Three points are illustrated. First, and in contrast to the Figure 4 results,
there is no significant difference between Japanese and American markets in the effective
organization of producers or the effective market stnucture constraint on producers.
Effective organization is slightly higher in the United States, but the difference is
negligible.12 Therefore, given similar networks of market interdependence in the two
economies, it isn't surprising to find no significant difference in the effective market
structure constraint on American and Japanese producers. 13
Second, the curves in Figure 5 show that market structure conditions of monopoly
control yield similarly high profits in both economies. These are the markets to the left of
Figure 5 - variable M is near zero to the extent that producers are well-organized and do
their buying and selling with diverse, disorganized suppliers and customers. The steep
decline in expected price-cost margin the left of Figure 5 replicates results reported for
more detailed American markets (Burt, 1992, Chap. 3; Burt, Yasuda and Guilarte, 1993,
Figure 2). The strongest market structure effects occur where market structure begins to
move away from conditions of monopoly control.
12.793 mean 0 versus .738 in Japan; 1.23 t-test, routine two-tail P is .22.
13 .028 and .021 mean M in US and Japan; 156 t-test, routine two-tail P is .12.
_______ __^_ 
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Third, the location of higher performance in Japanese markets is identified. Given
a Japanese market and an American market at the same level of producer disorganization
negotiating with similarly organized suppliers and customers, higher profits are expected
in the Japanese market. The amount higher increases for producers at a competitive
disadvantage. Profit margins don't decrease as quickly in Japan as market structure
constraint increases .14 The result is an increasing profit gap between Japanese and
American markets with increasing levels of competitive disadvantage. For example, at
the far right on Japanese curve are: education, textile, food, and transportation service
markets. 15 They perform better than similarly disadvantaged American markets do. At
the far right on American curve are non-profit organization, steel, transportation
equipment (except automobile), and construction markets.16 Their price-cost margins
are much less than those of similarly disadvantaged Japanese markets. The insert graph
in Figure 5 shows the gap. There is little difference in expected price-cost margin for
producers near the extreme conditions of monopoly control (M close to zero). Decrease
producer organization, or increase the organization of suppliers and customers, such that
market structure constraint M increases to .01, and the Japanese producer can expect to
earn 3¢ more profit on each dollar of sales than a similarly constrained American
producer. Increase constraint to its average level, .025, and the Japanese producer can
expect to earn 6¢ more profit per sales dollar than a similarly constrained American
producer. Increase constraint to the maximum among American markets, .05, and the
Japanese producer can expect to earn 8¢ more profit per sales dollar than a similarly
constrained American. The point is that the biggest performance differences between
similarly structured American and Japanese markets occur between the most
competitively disadvantaged markets. Being at a competitive disadvantage in Japan is
less costly than in the United States.
14 7 is -.128 across American markets, -.106 in Japan. This result could also be obtained with the
concentration data, but it is obscured in the separate direct and indirect effects, and a,yin Table 1. Instead
of defining effective market structure constraint M, with effective organization scores 0, define observed
market structure constraint M with concentration data 0. The expected price-cost margin, eP a[IM], is
defined by the following ordinary least-squares estimates, a is 1.069, y is -.034 across the Japanese
markets; and a is .972, y is -.048 across the American markets. The smaller y shows that margins decline
more slowly in Japan with increasing market structure constraint.
15 Those markets plus repair, civil engineering, non-profit organization, paper products, forestry,
and wooden products markets are the lo markets on the far right.
16 Those markets plus, electric and communication equipment, non-ferrous metal, textile,
automobile, parts and accessories of electric and electronic equipment, and civil engineering are the 10
markets on the right.
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SUMMARY
With census data on comparably defined American and Japanese markets, I have assessed
the extent to which competitive advantage is determined by market network structure in
the two economies. I draw three conclusions from the analysis.
First, despite the very broad definition of markets in these data, there is evidence to
argue for similar structure-performance connections in Japan and the United States. The
market structure effects known to predict performance differences between American
markets - performance decreasing with market disorganization and the network
constraint of organization beyond the market - also predict performance differences
between Japanese markets.
Second, the network of market interdependencies is very similar in Japan and the
United States - allowing for certain outlier transactions. Transactions between power
utilities, petroleum refining, and crude petroleum and coal are conducted more between
domestic producers in the United States. Steel for machinery and metal products are
more often purchased from domestic producers in Japan. Household electrical appliances
are more constructed in Japan with parts and accessories purchased from Japanese
producers. The American taste for beef is reflected in the larger domestic transactions
among the American food, livestock, and feed grain markets. Medical and health
services in the United States are more often provided with instruments manufactured by
American firms. Put aside these nine outliers among 946 transactions, and the transaction
strength between two Japanese markets is correlated .825 with the strength of transaction
between the corresponding two American markets.
Third, profit margins aren't identical in corresponding Japanese and American
markets, but they are sufficiently similar in relative magnitude across markets for the
average difference between Japanese and American markets to be attributed to random
chance. The performance difference varies with market structure, and, between similarly
structured American and Japanese markets, they increase with competitive disadvantage.
Being at a competitive disadvantage in Japan is less costly than in the United States.
_____________ili______ ____
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APPENDIX
Define Markets
Applying the structural hole argument in empirical research involves four steps. The first
is to aggregate players into markets. This is analogous to the familiar network analysis
task of reducing a network to a density table (which could then be further reduced by
recoding entries to zeroes and ones to define a blockmodel). Figure 1 is an illustration
(taken from Burt, 1992). The sociogram is a fragment of the trade network around four
producers in the market distinguished by the gray circle. Producers buy supplies from
certain markets and sell their goods to customers in certain markets. Each dot is an
organization, a player, producing something. Lines indicate connections between
producers within markets and indicate aggregate buying and selling between markets.
Players are contained in circles by their equivalent relations to players in other circles.
The four players in the gray circle at the center of the figure, for example, all have
relations with someone in each of the six other circles. The many inter-player relations
between circles are replaced by a single line indicating their aggregate inter-market
relation. The circles are markets in the sense that players within circles are substitutable.
The relational resources that one player brings to transactions are what other players in
the same circle bring.
Figure 1 About Here
Measure Organization Within Markets
The second step is to measure the extent to which producers are connected within markets
such that there are few choices between independent trade partners for players dealing
with the market. Of alternative ways to measure producer coordination (e.g., Burt, 1992,
p. 63-64), concentration ratios are simple and have been successful in empirical research.
Coordination is high to the extent that a few disconnected producers are responsible for a
large proportion of market output. Assume that the producers in Figure 1 are the same
size. A producer in the gray circle accounts for 25% of market business, the coordinated
producers in market A account for 100% of their market's business, and a single producer
in disorganized market C accounts for 12.5% of market business.
Measure Organization Beyond Each Market
The task of the third step is to measure the extent to which there are few structural holes
between producer supplier and customer transactions. This can be measured by the
extent to which producer buying and selling is concentrated in a few key customer and
__ 
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supplier markets and those markets contain few independent players. Network constraint
weight wij is the squared proportion of producer i business that directly or indirectly
involves market j:
wij = (ij + Iq PiqPqj) 2,
where i * q • j and pij is the proportion of producer business that directly involves market
j. The direct proportion Pij is the dollars of buying and selling between markets i and j,
(zij+zji), divided by the sum of all producer buying and selling with other markets;
Zj(zij+zji), i • j, where zij is dollars of sales from market i to j in the input-output table.
The exact specification of the network weights is arbitrary.
The table at the bottom of Figure 1 illustrates constraint. Transactions between
markets are dichotomous in the illustration. Proportions are therefore one over the
number of a market's ties. Columns in the table show the extent to which gray-circle
producer transactions with each supplier-customer market are constrained. The constraint
coefficient cij (bottom row of table) is the product of coordination among players in
market j (Oj in second row) and the coordination of transactions through the market
(network weights wij in first row). Producer transactions with market C are least
constrained. Market C players are disorganized and have no business with the other
markets. Producer transactions with market A are most constrained. Market A players
operate as a single organization and do business in three of the other supplier-customer
markets.
Define Structural Autonomy To Predict Performance
There are two directions to go with the constraint parameters. One leads to theories of
social and formal organization. The transaction-specific cij describe the resource
constraints that shape the form of organizations expected to be successful in a market. In
structural hole theory, they measure the cost of producers doing business with market j
under the rules of competitive pricing. If business with market j is constrained, then
producers have an incentive to move the transaction from the rules of competitive price to
another context; vertically integrating into market j, for example, so that corporate
authority defines the negotiation. In transaction cost theory, the constraint parameters are
the criterion for Coase's entrepreneur deciding to vertically integrate into market j. Their
role in the organization theory of resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978;
Pfeffer, 1987), transaction cost (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1989), and population
ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) is reviewed elsewhere (Burt, 1988, pp. 390-393;
1992, Chaps. 6 and 7; see Davis and Powell, 1992, for more detailed review of resource
dependence and transaction cost theory).
 __I
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The other direction to go with the constraint parameters leads to stratification
theories of inequality and achievement. The sum of constraint parameters measures the
aggregate constraint on producers; C varies inversely with the extent to which a market's
suppliers and customers are spread across many disconnected markets that contain many
competitors.
Ci = zj ij = j wijOj,
where i j. In Figure 1, aggregate network constraint on the gray-circle producers
is the sum of the transaction-specific constraints (C = .26). For each of the aggregate
markets, I have 43 constraint coefficients from the other production markets, plus a
coefficient for households, and another for government. Variable C is the sum of 45 cij
for each producer market L
Estimate Effective Organization
I have measured market structure to predict market performance. The price-cost margin
expected in a market is a function of market structural autonomy where structural
autonomy in market i is defined as;
eP = Ai (l1-Oi)(CY = a(l-i)(7j wijOj)Y,
where i • j, is the direct effect of producer disorganization on performance, and 'Y is the
indirect effect on performance of producer organization filtered through the network of
market interdependencies wij. I am confident in the census data on market performance
and the network of market interdependencies, but am suspicious of the concentration data
on organization within markets. Consider the following model in which observed
producer organization, concentration 0, is replaced by a measure of organization inferred
from its effects, effective organization 0:
eP = a[(k-Oi)(Xj wijOj)] Y,
where i • j, constant k equals 1.001, and the term in brackets is the aggregate effective
market structure constraint on producers;
eP = aM]Y.
This is a summary expression of the market structure-performance linkage, in which M is
the effective market structure constraint. Effective organization and effective market
structure constraints are distinct from variables such as concentration which measure
observed features of producer organization believed to be responsible for market
performance. There are no degrees of freedom. Performance in each market is
1________________11___ _ _ _I _II
______^_X __l____a______j__D _III
17
completely determined by the direct effect of effective organization among producers and
the indirect effect of effective organization in key supplier and customer markets.17
17The Newton-Raphson iterative algorithm for obtaining effective organization scoes is described
in the Appendix to Burt, Yasuda and Guilarte (1993). Applied here, the algorithm converged in 39
iterations for the American markets and 41 iterations for the Japanese markets, with a .001 convergence
criterion. The direct and indirect effects of producer organization are equal in this application (ratio r is set
to 1.0; Burt, Yasuda and Guilarte, 1993, Table 7). Observed price-cost margins are correlated 1.0000 with
the margins expected from effective market structure constraint. I tried altenative start values for the
iterations; the observed concentration scores and random fractions drawn from a uniform distribution.
Effective organization scores obtained with the alternative start values are correlated 1.0000.
·---- -- -------i------
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Table 1.
Basic Results Predicting Market Price-Cost Margins.
Japanese American
All Markets Markets Markets
..~~~~~   ~    ~ ~~ I .. II Il 
Number of Markets
R 2
Intercept (a)
Adjustment for Higher
Japanese Profits
Adjustment for Higher
Land-Oil Profits
Effect of Disorganization
Within Markets ()
Effect of Organization
Beyond Markets (y)
88
.507
1.002
44
.448
1.008
.042
[.139]
(1.6)
.328
[.686]
(8.7)
-.035
[-.263]
(-3.3)
-.042
[-.231]
(-2.7)
.329
[.693]
(5.5)
-.025
[-.235]
(-2.0)
-.070
[-.329]
(-3.3)
-.059
[-.266]
(-2.1)
-.034
[-.197]
(-1.9)
44
.596
1.007
.325
[.685]
(6.7)
NoTE- These are ordinary least-squares estimates predicting price-cost margins with models described in
the text. Standardized coefficients are in [brackets] and routine t-tests are in (parentheses).
-------
Table 2.
Correlations between Japanese and American Transactions
by Kind of Markets Connected.
Distribution
Raw Materials Manufacturing and Services
Raw Materials .951
(21)
Manufacturing .502 .721
(154) (231)
Distribution and .347 .763 .694
Services (105) (330) (105)
NOTE - Transaction strength is the percent of domestic buying and selling by two markets that
occurs between the markets (plotted in Figure 3). Number of transactions in each correlation is
given in parentheses.
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AF
C
E
D E F
no holes between markets
no holes within markets
network constraint = cij
= 0.1512 0.0851 0.0278 0.0494 0.0434 0.0434
= 1.0000 0.1250 0.1250 1.0000 0.1250 1.0000
= 0.1512 0.0106 0.0035 0.0494 0.0054 0.0434
Figure 1.
Network Fragment Illustrating Market Structure Constraint.
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Figure 2.
Price-Cost Margins in
Corresponding Japanese and American Markets.
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Figure 3.
Corresponding Japanese and American Transactions.
(Transaction strength is the percent of domestic buying and selling by two markets that occurs
between the markets. Transactions under one percent are excluded.)
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Figure 5.
Form of Market Structure Effects.
(Dots indicate where markets occur on the function. One Japanese market to the far right
is excluded to amplify the section of the function describing most markets.)
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